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Today, housing programs are being developed in a period
called "New Federalism." Programs can be designed with new
and innovative approaches with little or no interference
from the federal government. In some instances, local
governments do not have to justify their activities on na¬
tional policy grounds.
The City of Atlanta is planning to implement a mortgage
revenue bond program to alleviate its substandard housing
conditions. In some city areas, more than twenty-five per¬
cent of the existing housing stock is substandard. The pro¬
gram will be self-supported through the issuance and sale
of tax-exempt revenue bonds. The proposed mortgage revenue
bond program is characterized by issues relating to the past
mortgage lending patterns in Atlanta, and equity, public
policy, and market considerations. This paper investigates
these issues as they relate to the financing of housing for
low income groups through the use of a municipal tax-exempt
revenue bond program for the City of Atlanta, These are
issues that other cities have attempted to resolve for
various reasons. Generally, the conclusion was that the
proposed mortgage revenue bond program cannot serve the
needs of low income Atlantans.
Information from interviews, pamphlets, reports,
correspondence, articles, and books provided a reservoir
of data from which to draw conclusions and recommendations.
The recommendations will suggest policy alternatives to
the proposed mortgage revenue bond program. Recommenda¬
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A slowly developing focal point of activity in
municipalities today is the financing of housing through
the use of tax-exempt bonds. Illinois is one of few states
that allows its political subdivisions to issue tax-exempt
mortgage revenue bonds. The bond proceeds provide money for
low cost housing because interest rates are below the cur¬
rent market level. Essentially, the proceeds are used to
supplement mortgage money supplied by the private sector.
Presently, the supply of mortgage money in Atlanta is
insufficient to meet the needs of potential home owners.
Likewise, Atlanta is experiencing a rapid rise in housing
costs and home mortgage rates. Both of these factors make
homeownership more difficult. This is true not only for the
poor, but increasingly for the middle class, the young and
upper income groups. The situation is further aggravated
by high property values and increased property taxes.
As a result, Atlanta has a serious shortage of de¬
cent, safe, and sanitary housing. In order to alleviate
this situation, Atlanta, through enabling legislation from
the state, is preparing to implement a mortgage revenue bond
program financed through the sale of tax-exempt revenue
bonds. .The program will be self-supporting and will avoid
expansion of local government responsibilities into
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financial matters, in that local financial institutions
will originate and service the mortgage loans. However,
there are issues centered around a mortgage revenue bond
program that require investigation and analysis. The
issues involve lending practices, public policy, equity,
and market considerations. Therefore, this paper focuses
on these considerations as they relate to the financing
of housing for low income groups through the use of a muni¬
cipal tax-exempt revenue bond program for the City of
Atlanta.
Interest in this area grew out of the writer's in¬
ternship experience with the Bureau of A.ccounting and Bud¬
get Administration in the City of Atlanta. The Bureau con¬
sists of the Accounting Service Division, the Budget and
Research Division, and the Grant Accounting Division.
Generally, the Bureau of Accounting and Budget Administra¬
tion handles all receipts of the city and advises the
Mayor, Commissioner of Finance, Chief Administrative Offi¬
cer, and members of council through periodic submission of
financial reports which analyze all financial matters of
the city. The creation and management of a tax-exempt
mortgage revenue bond program would fall under the Bureau's
purview.
The issues surrrounding the proposed mortgage
revenue bond are not issues peculiar to the City of Atlanta.
Rather, they are issues with which other cities have had to
grapple since the inception of the mortgage revenue bond
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concept. Nevertheless, a mortgage revenue bond program
would have firm legal foundation according to several
national housing policies.
The Housing Act of 1949 established a national
housing policy in the United States. The stated objective
of the Act is to provide, "a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family."^ This goal
was reaffirmed in later housing and urban development legis
lation which was enacted during the sixties and seventies.
The Urban Renewal and Neighborhood Development Programs
represented the first massive federal housing policies re¬
garding the inner city. The important impact of this legis
lation on inner-city areas was large-scale clearance or
demolition of housing unsuitable for habitation. However,
the Housing Acts of 1964 and 1965 signaled a shift in fed¬
eral policy toward housing rehabilitation. These Acts
created a rehabilitation loan program and the Federally
Assisted Code Enforcement (FACE) Program respectively.
Under the 1964 Act, participating cities (Atlanta was a
participant) could provide low interest loans to property
owners in areas undergoing FACE-funded code enforcement.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
created the Community Development Program. As a result,
funding for urban renewal and several other programs was
■^U. S., Congress and the Nation, 81st Congress,
2nd Session, 1965^ (1945-1964) .
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consolidated into one block grant to municipalities. The
Community Development Act permitted local governments to
design programs for specific local needs. Previous urban
programs were funded through categorical grants that sped
fied purposes for which funds may be used. The CDP repre¬
sents the "New Federalism” approach to urban assistance.
Only general housing parameters are set by the provisions
of the Community Development Act; therefore, programs can
be designed for local situations and innovative approaches
can be devised for housing rehabilitation. Today, the
funding and scope of the CD concept have been expanded.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 created
the Urban Development Action Grants Program, These grants
fund local projects designed to secure private sector com¬
mitment of funds to stimulate local economies.
A tax-exempt mortgage revenue bond program in At¬
lanta would also have legal foundation in the Revenue and
Expenditure Control Act of 1968. This Act explicitly regu
lates industrial development bonds and expressly allows
bonds to be issued by a local jurisdiction to finance resi
dential family units.
However, whether or not Atlanta has the legal au¬
thority to implement a mortgage revenue bond program de¬
pends on the state legislature in passing House Bill 494.
The bill will establish Urban Residential Finance Authori¬
ties for large municipalities in Georgia. House Bill 494
must be passed by the Georgia General Assembly before
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Atlanta can implement a mortgage revenue bond program.
The bill does not delineate the program features for mimi-
cipalities of Georgia. Generally, the bill required that
the population of each municipality is 400,000 and that
program participants have incomes less than two and one
half times of the median, household income in the municipality
creating the Authority. Also, each Authority may, at its
discretion, establish a maximum household income and may
allocate all or part of its available funds to households
with incomes less than the maximum. These general require¬
ments do not resolve the issues centering around the pro¬
posed mortgage revenue bond program for Atlanta.
In sxammary, if a tax-exempt mortgage revenue bond
program were initiated for Atlanta there would be firm
legal foundations to support the program at the federal
level.
The primary mechanism used by the city in pro¬
moting housing rehabilitation is the four-year Conceni,-
trated Code Enforcement Program (CCEP) implemented in
1976. Property owners in need of financial assistance
to rehabilitate their housing due to code enforcement are
eligible for grants or low interest loans or both. The
CCEP program focuses on highly concentrated areas of sub¬
standard housing. The interior and exterior of all houses
in concentrated substandard areas are inspected. However,
the CCEP is not effective for several reasons:
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(1) housing units are falling into the sub¬
standard category as quickly as, or
more quickly than, units are being
repaired. Increased unemplo3nottent and
depressed household income in Atlanta also
resulted in lower or irregular home
maintenance;
(2) inadequate and inefficient administration
and staff also contribute to the inadequacy
of CCEP. The Bureau of Buildings which
administers code enforcement maintains
that increased staffing levels would
permit the bureau to perform its duties
more effectively, and
(3) it has been argued by some that code enforce¬
ment should be basically used in areas to
eliminate the first stages of deterioration,
and not in areas that require more extensive
treatment^
In order to analyze the issues centered around the
proposed mortgage revenue bond program in Atlanta, past
and present mortgage activity in Atlanta had to be examined.
The first section of the paper examines recent mortgage
activity in Atlanta. Background information about mort¬
gage lending is necessarily included to enhance the
reader's knowledge.
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Philippa A. Ahuja and Howard Katzman, Housing
Rehabilitation Policy in Atlanta (Atlanta; Research
Atlanta, Inc., 1^78), p. l8.
II. MORTGAGE PATTERNS OF ATLANTA
In July 1977, twenty-eight percent of the city's
housing (50, 972 units) was substandard according to the
city's housing codes. The twenty-eight percent represents
an increase of 51.7 percent over a six-year period. In
some city areas twenty-five to sixty percent of the rental
units are substandard. Six Neighborhood Planning Units
(homogeneous in terms of average household income, housing
condition, ethnic makeup, etc.) contain twenty-two percent
of the city's total housing stock and forty percent of the
city's substandard units. The six NPUs include the West
End, the area surrounding Atlanta University, Mechanicsville,
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Edgewood, and Hunter Hills.
Over the past several years, the City of Atlanta
has become increasingly concerned about the physical de¬
terioration in many inner city neighborhoods. As in many
other urban areas, this deterioration is largely due to
the exodus of middle and upper income homeowners and the
resources they possess. Some contend that the influx of
blacks and poor whites triggered this exodus. However, many
have claimed that neighborhood decline is not only the col¬




disinvestment posture of Savings and Loan Associations
in inner city neighborhoods.
Savings and Loan Associations are the primary
originators of conventional mortgage loans and were origi¬
nally chartered by the federal government to meet the
thrift and home credit needs of residents living within
the communities they serve. But it has been alleged by
some that Savings and Loan Associations have violated
their chartered obligations by seeking more lucrative in¬
vestment opportunities in the suburbs while refusing con¬
ventional loans', in certain city neighborhoods without re¬
gard to the credit worthiness of the individual applicant
or to the quality of the specific neighborhoods. This
practice is called "redlining" or disinvestment and it is
argued that this is a major reason for inner city decline
and housing blight.
In 1976, the Savings and Loan Associations ex¬
plained that the absence of conventional lending in certain
neighborhoods was due to factors over which they had on
control, such as aging of structures, poor city services,
racial transition, and rational economic decisions. These
factors undermine property values and thus the collateral
on loans. These factors have accelerated deterioration in
Atlanta. Savings and Loan Associations also contend that
if a neighborhood is not receiving conventional credit, it
is either because no creditworthy applicants are seeking
loans or because the risks involved are such that granting
9
a long-term loan would be unwise business decision.^
According to Philippa Ahuja, the availability and
awarding of conventional mortgage credit is a necessary
precondition for neighborhood revitalization and continu¬
ing stability.^ Experiences in other cities have shown
that without conventional mortgage activity, middle in¬
come homebuyers are less willing to buy for fear that
they may have difficulty later in selling. Furthermore,
existing homeowners are less able to arrange rehabilita¬
tion financing and thus must often go without needed home
improvements.
There is no objective data on existing mortgage
lending patterns within the Atlanta area and it has been
difficult to identify accurately those neighborhoods where
disinvestment has occurred. But case histories do exist
that may suggest that disinvestment may be a problem.
Whether disinvestment is widespread or isolated to cer¬
tain neighborhoods or ethnic and racial groups still re¬
mains to be doctraiented. . ^
^Interview with Philippa Ahuja, Research Atlanta,
Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 1 February 1979.
^Ibid.
Michael Stegman, Housing Investmeht in the Inner
City, Dynamics of Decline (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972)
p. 176.
^Interview with Philippa Ahuja, Research Atlanta,
Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 1 February 1979.
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In view of the aforementioned, the purpose of this
section is to describe the patterns of conventional, fed¬
erally insured, and other types of first mortgage activity
(new construction) on single-family houses in Atlanta.
The discussion will indicate the need for a well-planned
housing program in Atlanta geared for the low and moderate
income families. One underlying assumption that origi¬
nated from interviews is that the presence of conventional
credit in a neighborhood is vitally important to maintain¬
ing a neighborhood's physical condition and socioeconomic
character.
In relation to the above stated assumption, it is
necessary to comment on the sources of home mortgage loans.
The primary sources of home loans are as follows: (1) Sav¬
ings and Loan Associations, the primary source of conven¬
tional lending; (2) mortgage bankers, the primary origi¬
nators of government insured loans; (3) commercial banks,
making primarily conventional loans; (4) the Veterans
Administration, originating VA insured loans; and (5) sel¬
lers , making loans on their own homes.
The last four sources are important for mortgage
lending; however, they cannot replace conventional lend¬
ing by Savings and Loan Associations for a variety of
reasons. Commercial banks are reluctant to take the risk
of long-term loans on non-income producing property, pre¬
ferring usually the shorter term, higher yield consumer
and business loans. Although the Veterans Administration
11
insures many home loans, it originates only a few itself.
According to Philippa Ahuja, it does so only on houses
which it has repossessed due to foreclosures on VA-insured
g
loans previously originated elsewhere.
Seller-financed loans place an undue burden of
risk on the seller, who usually would prefer that the home-
buyer find other financing. Therefore, the volume of such
lending is also extremely limited. Mortgage bankers have
great expense and many problems associated with their
governmemt insured lending, especially through FHA. For
these reasons, home mortgages through these four sources
9
are not desired by many prospective homebuyers.
As a preface to a discussion of mortgage lending
patterns in Atlanta, a brief discussion of conventional and
government insured loans will further explain lending pat¬
terns in Atlanta. Savings and Loan Associations obtain
their investment funds primarily from the inflow of deposi¬
tors’ savings. The interest rates on these savings are
regulated by the federal government through the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and consequently, the price
Savings and Loan Associations have to pay for the bulk of
their investment funds is limited by law. Mortgage ban¬




Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured loans origi¬
nated in the capital market where interest rates can and
usually do go higher. Mortgage bankers also sell their
loans to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
and the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA).
These agencies were created by the federal government to
increase the marketability of mortgages.
When the inflow of deposits or savings decrease a
great deal. Savings and Loan Associations must also sell
their mortgages in the secondary market (selling to GNMA
and FNMA). Georgia usury laws prohibit mortgage loans
at interest rates over ten percent and, as a result, local
Savings and Loan Associations will discount their loans to
increase their yields when national interest rates go over
ten percent. However, this discounting, according to Re¬
search Atlanta, is rarely enough to make a conventional loan
more expensive than an FHA loan originated by a mortgage
banker. The reason is that there is an additional 0.5
1 1
percent insurance cost contained in FHA backed loans.
FHA loans are less flexible than loans from a Sav¬
ings and Loan Association. A holder of an FHA mortgage
12
usually does not have adequate forebearance opportunities.
^^Interview with Robert S, Warwick, Federal Home
Loan Board of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 1 February 1979.
Ibid.
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Forebearance is the practice of accepting partial
13
If foreclosure occurs with a FHA insured loan, the mort¬
gage banker is reimbursed for the full value of the loan,
not the discounted price which originally was paid. More
over, all costs incurred during foreclosure are paid to
the mortgage banker. On the other hand. Savings and Loan
Associations assijme the full risk on mortgages, and there¬
fore are more concerned about avoiding loan foreclosures,
Despite these disadvantages with FHA insured loans, many
people in Atlanta finance their homes through such loans.
The reason is that many people do not have the larger
down payment required for conventional loans.
The core problems with FHA backed mortgages rest
with the fast foreclosure practices of mortgage banks and
the large volune of FHA loans going into central city
neighborhoods, FHA loans attract low income homebuyers
who frequently abandon their homes. Nevertheless, FHA
backed loans in Atlanta provided mortgages for the low in
come during periods of very low mortgage lending by Sav¬
ings and Loan Associations in Atlanta. Thus, complete
replacement of government insured loans by conventional
loans is not desirable. But a combination of the two
would seem to suggest that the physical and socioeconomic
character of Atlanta will be enhanced.
Research Atlanta's 1976 study of mortgage lending
patterns in Atlanta showed that in 1974-75 Savings and
mortgage payments or setting up work-out agreements
through mortgage repa3nnent plans when homebuyers have
trouble making payments.
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Loan Associations provided 23.5 percent of all mortgage
loans in the City of Atlanta and provided an average of
13
35.7 percent in the surrounding counties.
In 1976, The Atlanta Mortgage Consortixjm (AMC)
was established to make mortgage and rehabilitation loans
in an area known as the "Railroad Loop." The area con¬
tains many neighborhoods with deteriorated housing and
little conventional mortgage activity. The following
institutions participate in the Atlanta loan consortium:
commercial banks-including Citizen and Southern, National
Bank of Georgia, Trust Company, First Georgia, Fulton
National, First National, and Citizen Trust; Savings and
Loan Association-including Fulton Federal, DeKalb Federal,
Mutual Federal, Fidelity Federal, Decatur Federal, Atlanta
Federal, Standard Federal, and First Federal.
The Consortixam of seven commercial banks and
eight Savings and Loan Associations set a goal of
$62,700,000 to be loaned for single-family home mortgages
and home rehabilitation loans on owner occupied proper¬
ties . The members committed themselves to make loans on
the same terms as suburban loans. These loans were to be
made by participating lenders acting individually over a
five-year period in neighborhoods within the Railroad Loop.
These neighborhoods included Techwood, Bedford Pine, Grant
1 3
Jay E. Gruber and Barbara R. Joye, Mortgage
Lending Patterns in Atlanta (Atlanta: Research Atlanta,
Inc. , 1976), p 17, Table I.
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Park and the West End.
The bulk of AMC loans, eighty-three percent, went
to the established and reviving neighborhoods, areas with
a high degree of mortgage activity before the inception
of AMC. These established neighborhoods did not con¬
tain a high proportion of substandard housing. Only
$2,522,990 of the $15,583,221 in mortgage loans were
allocated to areas with concentrated substandard housing.
The range of loans by census tract varied from $3,498,318
in Morningside to $0 in the Bedford-Pine and Techwood
areas. Moreover, the AMC members made 282 rehabilitation
loans and 481 mortgage loans in 1977. This implies that
the AMC is less effective in providing rehabilitation
financing as opposed to mortgage financing. The data
gathered by Research Atlanta X'jas based on mortgage loan
disclosure statements required under Public Law 94-200,
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. However, the law does
not require depository institutions to report demands
for loans. Therefore, it is not possible to determine
whether or not the mortgage lending patterns of the AMC
members are caused by lack of demand or factors related
14
to the industry's lending criteria.
In actuality, the Atlanta Mortgage Consortixim
assisted middle and upper income persons in obtaining
^^Interview with Robert S. Warwick, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 1 February
1979
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financing for the purchase and rehabilitation of single-
family homes in inner-city neighborhoods. Loan under¬
writing terms which are the same for suburbia cannot pos¬
sibly address the long-term needs of low and moderate
inner-city income residents. Therefore, the AMC to date
is one of several investment neighborhood housing programs
that contributes little to comprehensive housing revitali¬
zation concerns of Atlanta.
The Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) program
was established in Grant Park in 1976. Its purpose is
to assist eligible borrowers to obtain conventional or
government-insured financing and to make "high risk"
loans to persons who do not qualify for conventional
financing. NHS is a joint effort among the Grant Park
residents, Federal and local government, and lending in¬
stitutions to make mortgage money available to Grant
Park residents. The Grant Park neighborhood must meet
the following criteria to qualify for the neighborhood
Housing Services Program: (a) basically sound housing
structures showing early signs of lack of maintenance
and deterioration; (b) difficulty in obtaining mortgage
and home improvement loans; (c) distinct boundaries with
a stable anchor on one or more boundaries; (e) an area
large enough to stimulate investment but small enough to
permit early, visible success (one thousand to two thou¬
sand structures); (f) median income no less than eighty per¬
cent of the citywide median; and (g) average repair costs
17
not in excess of $5,000.^^
In general, Grant Park residents who wish to re¬
habilitate their homes apply to NHS. NHS inspects the
house and determines the rehabilitation cost, analyzes
the finances of the applicant to determine whether he
meets normal banking criteria, and identifies an appro¬
priate lending institution. The cooperation of the
resident, city government, and lending institution is
enlisted. Those residents determined creditworthy are
usually awarded loans from the lending institutions.
However, those that are deemed high risk are rejected
or given a loan directly from the "high risk" pool fund
set up by the NHS, Essentially, the NHS acts in an ad¬
visory capacity for residents, city government and lend¬
ing institutions in granting loans. The NHS has had some
success because it represents community investment from
lending institutions. However, it has been argued by
some that the City of Atlanta's financial commitment is
small.
Besides the AMC and NHS, the Georgia Residential
Finance Authority provides funds for low cost home mort¬
gage loans to families and persons of low and moderate
^Roger S. Ahlbrandt, et al., The Neighborhood
Housing Services Model: A Progress Assessment of the
Related Activities of the Urban Pveinvestment Task Force,
Stjmmary (Vlashington, D. C.: U.S. Development and
Research, 1975), p. 8.
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incomes. It is a statewide program created by the
Georgia General Assembly in 1974. One-third of the
funds is earmarked for rural areas, one-third for met¬
ropolitan counties, and one-third is distributed ac-
cording to demand.The Authority raises money by
issuing low interest tax-exempt bonds. The proceeds
are used to purchase government insured mortgages. Per¬
sons or families with annual incomes between $9,000 and
$14,500 are eligible. However, the Authority cannot
attract conventional lenders and government insured loans
traditionally lead to abandonment and poor forebearances.
On the other hand, the Urban Homesteading program
in Atlanta has great potential for contributing to neigh¬
borhood preservation. The program decreases the number
of deterioriating houses resulting from foreclosures on
government insured loans.. Abandoned houses are transferred
to the City of Atlanta by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, then sold for $1 to owner-occupants
who must bring them up to city code standards. Buyers
must provide proof of ability to finance the rehabilita¬
tion. However, in my view, the program appears to be
hampered due to the fact that it operates in the context
of other housing programs. In other words. Urban Home¬
steading is essentially an offshoot of government insured
loans that involve Federal Housing Administration and
^^Jay E. Gruber and Barbara R. Joye, Mortgage
Lending Patterns in Atlanta (Atlanta: Research Atlanta,
Inc., 1976), p. 2l.
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and Veterans Administration foreclosures. As a result,
the Urban Homesteading program is built upon the failu¬
res or shortcomings of other housing programs.
At present, the Federal Government is the only
source of public funds for housing rehabilitation in the
City of Atlanta. The two principal federal programs are
Section 8 and Section 312, created by the Housing Acts of
1937 and 1964 respectively. Section 8 is a rental assis¬
tance program. It was reactivated by the Housing and Com¬
munity Development Act of 1974. The program provides a
rent subsidy representing the difference between twenty-
five percent of a tenant's income and the "fair market
rent," which is viewed by owners of rental units and de¬
velopers as unrealistic and unprofitable. Therefore, use
of Section 8 has been restricted by Atlanta and private
developers.
Section 312 provides funds, as appropriated by
Congress, for three percent property rehabilitation loans.
The program involves owner-occupied, rental-residential
properties, and commercial property. Funding under the
program has been sporadic since its 1964 inception. There
is no income limit to qualify for loans, but the program
is directed at lower income households. The maximum sin¬
gle-family and apartment unit rehabilitation loan is
$27,000. However, the program does serve the housing
rehabilitation needs of three groups-owners of residential
property, rental residential property, and commercial
20
property, Therefore, Section 312 relates to varied
income levels, specifically to the middle and upper
income households, who do not necessarily need this
kind of rehabilitation loan. In the final analysis,
those in greatest need are competing with the middle
and upper income groups.
III. DISCRIMINATORY LENDING
CONSIDERATIONS
The impact of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's
Non-Discrimination Regulations, the Federal Equal Credit
Opportunity Acts, and the Fair Housing Acts will have on
a tax-exempt mortgage revenue bond program is unclear.
Specific income categories and locations to qualify for
home loans mean that there are implications with respect
to the application of FHLBB's Non-Discrimination regula¬
tions and possibly some legal concerns regarding ECOA
and Fair Housing Acts. How will lending institutions
ration funds when the demand for loans under the program
exceeds the supply? This question relates to the selec¬
tion process and criteria used by lending institutions to
make loans.
Savings and Loan Associations that are insured
by the FHLBB are prohibited from discriminating on the
basis of "income level or racial composition of area,"
by "age or location factors," and "through marketing
policies.Today, no resolution has been made regarding
^^United States League of Savings Associations,
considerations Relative to the Issuance of Industrial
Development Revenue feonds for Mortgage Lending (Chicago:
U. S . L^gue of Savings Associations ,1578) , pT 5.
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the disposition of the FHLBB. Recently, Jefferson
County, Kentucky requested an opinion from the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati regarding a proposed invol¬
vement in a tax-exempt residential mortgage bond program.
This case involved a mortgage revenue bond program to
finance new housing construction in Jefferson County,
which includes Louisville, Kentucky.
The Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati con¬
cluded that
.... the...proposed program would produce discrimina¬
tory effects. The proposal is to finance new
construction. If the program is operated in this
manner, this provision will have a discriminatory
effect, since based on building permits issued in
the last three years, less than 57o of new homes
built in Jefferson County were located in the
City of Louisville. Thus, the limitation of the
program to financing new construction could pro¬
duce a discriminatory result.^®
The issue raised by this opinion makes it unclear as to
how insured lenders of the Federal Home Loan Bank will
meet regulatory demands.
Discriminatory issues also involve political
issues, the situation where the demand for loans exceeds
the supply. The proposed mortgage revenue bond program
in Atlanta will be a subsidy housing program, not an
entitlement housing program. A subsidy program does not
offer subsidies to everyone who request them on demand;
however, entitlement programs do. Consequently, subsidy
18 Ibid.
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programs involve administrative approaches toward the
selection of who receives the subsidy and who does not.
Today, the states that have subsidy housing pro¬
grams financed through the sale of mortgage revenue bonds
have not established criteria prior to the selection
19
process. This may present problems later in defending
the selection process to borrowers who do not receive the
subsidized loans. It may also be difficult to develop
such criteria in a non-discriminatory way. It is clear
that lending institutions in Atlanta will have to consider
the potential regulatory and legal risks involved with a
municipal mortgage bond financed housing program.
According to the Chicago tax-exempt mortgage
revenue bond housing program, the selection process is
performed by local and county officials with respect to
20
income, geographic location, and financial restrictions.
This has grave implications for certain communities. At¬
lanta is likely to follow a very similar pattern if these
selection methods are not examined by strong community or¬
ganizations and responsible elected officials. Generally,
policies shift as local administrations shift.
19 Interview with Ed Sumber, Georgia Municipal
Association, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. 1 February 1979.
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Harvey Kapnick, "City of Chicago Mortgage
Revenue Bond Program" (Chicago: Advisory Committee's
Report, 1978), pp, 1-12.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The tax-exempt mortgage bond program also raises
policy questions. The major reason is that there are no
restrictions on who can be designated to benefit from
this subsidized mortgage money. The position of the
federal government regarding tax-exempt authority sel¬
dom is more than to state that the power be used to pro¬
mote the public welfare. As a result, few mortgage bond
programs meet the needs of low and moderate income families
21
within central citities.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine the
nature and extent of the potential public benefits of a
mortgage revenue bond program in Atlanta. According to
other mortgage programs, the potential benefits are as
follows:
Direct Benefits-
Reduced costs of financing homeownership for
the mortgagor (prospective homebuyer)
Indirect Benefits-
(1) Increased flow of housing services
(2) Improvement in neighborhood quality of
life
21
Interview with Philippa Ahuja.
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(3) Net increase in employment of labor as
a result of new housing construction
(4) Generation of new sales, income and
property tax revenues to state and
local governments
Potential Costs-
(1) Loss of federal, and in some cases, state
tax revenue
(2) Increase in closing cost to borrower, and
(3) Increase in cost for the housing authority
in maintaining contingency reserve funds
The initial claim for social benefits in Atlanta relates
to the impact tax-exempt mortgage bonds will have on home
purchasing power. The impact would have several dimen¬
sions: a) persons who would not have otherwise been able
to purchase a home are now enabled to do so through the
new mortgage plan; b) persons may make their home pur¬
chases sooner with the help of the new program; and c)
persons who would have purchased a home at a point in the
future, could do so at a lower cost. The last two dimen¬
sions are notable. The program involves increasing home-
ownership for those who can afford to purchase via conven¬
tional mortgage organizations, as well as, those who cannot
afford to purchase homes. As a result, large groups of mid¬
dle and upper income families will benefit from the program
just as much, if not more. Little subsequent analysis is
needed if everyone qualifies as a potential beneficiary.
However, making sure that beneficiaries are famil¬
ies who would not otherwise have been able to purchase a
26
home will prove difficult in Atlanta. Subsidized mort¬
gages which attract households with adjusted gross in¬
comes between $20,000 to $40,000 are not tailored to low
income households anywhere. The Denver, Pueblo and
Chicago mortgage bond programs proved this. This leads
one to conclude that there is not a significant difference
between a public mortgage bond program and those in the
private sector.
One way to analyze the benefit of a public mort¬
gage bond program is to examine the monthly mortgage
amount required under certain interest rates. As stated
earlier, the proposed mortgage bond program in Atlanta
will use conventional underwriting standards in awarding
mortgage loans. Table I below indicates the monthly mort¬




Mortgage 8% oo 9% 9%% 10% 10%%
$ 20,000 146.75 153.78 160.92 168.17 175.51 182.95
30,000 220.13 230.67 241.39 252.26 263.27 274.42
40,000 293.51 307.57 321.85 336.34 351.03 365.90
50,000 366.88 384.46 402.31 420.43 438.79 457.37
60,000 440.26 461.35 482.77 504.51 526.54 548.84
70,000 513.63 538.24 563.24 588.60 614.30 640.32
80,000 587.01 615.13 643.70 672.68 702.06 731.79
90,000 660.39 692.02 724.16 756.77 789.81 823.27
100,000 733.76 768.91 804.62 840.85 877.57 914.74
Source: Grambrell, Russell, Forbes Law Firm
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Generally, interest is the largest component of
mortgage payments in the early years, A small increase
in interest rates will dramatically increase the amount
of monthly payments. According to Gambrell, Russell and
Forbes Law Firm of Atlanta, a two and one-half percent
change in mortgage interest rates (from 8% to 10%7o)
results in a change in monthly payments of almost twenty-
22
five percent. Table I represents the impact of interest
rates without a mortgage revenue bond program. Mortgage
interest rates below market value impact on homeowner-
ship also. However, appreciable benefits to the low and
moderate income households are unclear. Gambrell, Russell,
and Forbes concluded that the proposed mortgage revenue
bond program in Atlanta would follow closely Table II on
next page.
22
Interview with Gambrell, Russell, and Forbes,
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Both of these tables indicate that a large percentage of
the beneficiaries of the proposed mortgage revenue bond
program will be middle and upper income households.
It is important to note that federal authority
under which these mortgage bonds are issued do not place
any "social constraints" on the use of the proceeds or
the role the program would play in national housing and
urban policies. This means that the issuers of the tax-
exempt mortgage bonds do not have to justify their activi¬
ties on national policy grounds. If this is true, equity
considerations will surface.
The Chicago plan suggests that a tax-exempt mort¬
gage bond program does not provide sufficient financial
help for the truly lower income groups. The $40,000 in¬
come limit which is a requirement in the Chicago plan
excludes the low income and poor. Generally, a gross
adjusted income of $20,000 is required for mortgage loans
of $40,000. The City initiating a mortgage bond program
will follow the general accepted criteria used by the pri¬
vate sector in marketing bonds and making home loans.
Market impositions such as rating service requirements,
origination standards, insurance requirements, and others
require that a large porportion of the loans be awarded in
a profit-oriented way. The primary beneficiaries, there¬
fore, will not be appreciably different from those already
served in the private market.
30
A proposed mortgage revenue bond program in
Atlanta also runs the risk of displacement of residents.
As property values increase, due to rehabilitation or
adjacent new home construction, many low income residents
in Atlanta will have to abandon their residence. Poor
Atlantans who cannot meet the criteria for home loans may
be faced with high property taxes.
On the other hand, a mortgage revenue bond pro¬
gram is an attempt to lure middle income families back to
Atlanta. Mortgage lending patterns in Atlanta show that
mortgage investment follows the middle and upper income
groups. Housing rehabilitation in Atlanta centers around
whether or not middle income groups are present to pro¬
vide lucrative investments for Savings and Loan Associa¬
tions. The middle and upper income households tradition¬
ally stimulate mortgage activity and one major criterion
mortgage lending institutions use in granting loans is.
the diversification of city dwellers. Futhermore, the
bond market requires collateral for mortgage loans. Tra¬
ditionally, middle and upper income groups are able to
provide the required collateral. Atlanta also has a com¬
mitment through its comprehensive community development




Speech by Mayor Maynard Jackson, "Housing Pro¬
gram Statement." Delivered to the City Council, City of
Atlanta, 1977.
In order to analyze the policy implications re¬
garding a proposed mortgage revenue bond program, the in¬
cremental model appears to be most appropriate. The
criteria used to select the incremental model is based
on the general criteria used by Thomas Dye in Under¬
standing Public Policy. Thomas Dye's criteria are based
on the utility of a model in expressing relationships of
reality. Incrementalism views public policy as a con¬
tinuation of past activities with only incremental modi¬
fications. According to economist Charles Lindblom,
decision-makers do not annually review the whole range of
existing and proposed policies, identify the actual prob¬
lems, research and identify actual beneficiaries and then
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make a decision on relevant information. Incremen¬
talism implies conservatism in that existing programs
and policies are generally accepted by decision-makers.
Although Thomas Dye applies the incremental model to the
public sector, it can be applied to the private sector as
well.
The proposed mortgage bond program will be struc¬
tured around already established loan underwriting stan¬
dards of local Savings and Loan Associations. The policy
^^Charles Lindblom,"The Science of Muddling Through,"
Public Admiriistration, ed. Robert Golembiewski, Frank
Gibson, and Goeffrey Y. Cornog, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand
McNally College,1972), pp. 311-330.
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of Savings and Loan Associations have been to stimulate
mortgage activity in suburbia. Obviously, suburbia can
provide more lucrative investment opportunities than
Atlanta and decision-makers of Savings and Loan Associa¬
tions will not readily change their policies. The incre¬
mental approach tells one that routines are difficult to
alter and individuals develop a personal stake in the
continuation of practices, especiallv where profit is a
main ingredient in determining investment possibilities.
The question of public policy also relates to the
structural obstacles of housine programs in Atlanta. The
local administration, with local autonomy, flexibility,
and participation in decision-making has provided the
environment for Atlanta to implement various housing pro¬
grams. As a result, many housing programs can be devel¬
oped to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the real problems regarding decent housing in Atlanta
appear to be unemplo3mient and fragmentation of housing
programs. Adeauate incomes will provide residents in
Atlanta with the means to purchase decent housing. There¬
fore, Atlanta City Government and the private sector
should concentrate their efforts toward developing strat¬
egies that will provide inner city residents with adequate
incomes. In other words, the real problem pertaining to
the lack of decent housing in Atlanta may involve under¬
employment and unemployment of residents who live in sub¬
standard housing.
V. MARKET CONSIDERATIONS
A mortgage revenue bond program will also raise
housing market considerations. A substantial increase
in mortgage credit at below market interest rates may
cause non-participating lenders to lose outstanding com¬
mitments and/or new commitments. The impact of this
appears to depend on local market conditions and the spe¬
cific targeted population for which mortgages are gene¬
rated. The profitability of participating lenders depends
on the balance between the negative market conditions on
non-participating and participating lending profits from
origination fees, servicing fees, escrow accounts, etc.
According to the U.S. League of Savings and Loan
Association, mortgage credit will impact on local housing
25
prices and tax revenues. Home prices will rise because
of the demand for homes. Benefits will accrue to the
seller. At the same time, the City increases its property
tax revenue. Available mortgage credit means that bene¬
fits will go to the buyer in the form of lower mortgage
pa3niients, the seller in the form of higher sales prices,
and taxing authority in the form of higher assessments.
25
United States League of Savings Association,
Considerations Relative to the Issuance of Industrial




To the extent that previously unutilized labor and mate¬
rial are employed, net increase in income and sales taxes
will be realized. More importantly, the local government
will be in a position to capitalize more on higher pro¬
perty values.
In order to sell municipal mortgage revenue bonds,
certain rating requirements must be met. As a matter of
standard business practice, and as a matter of compliance
with some state statutes, municipal bonds must be rated
by a bond rating company. Atlanta uses Standard and
Poor's and Moody's to rate its municipal bonds. The
specific types of items which these rating companies in¬
clude are the prior record of the municipality and the in¬
dividual Savinss and Loan Association, orieinatine and
servicing capability of the Savings and Loan Association,
economic diversification of the municipality in which
mortgages are confined, and the ability of the housing
market to absorb an influx of new mortgage money. All of
these items would require financial analysis by the city
26
government of Atlanta. A proposed mortgage revenue bond
program must also address the potential cash-flow reinvest¬
ment risk. Generally, mortgage repayments follow a sched¬
uled cash flow pattern analogous to a scheduled serial
bond issue. That is, mortgage loan repajnnent are typically
26
Lennox L. Moak and Albert M. Hillhouse, Cohcepts
and Practices in Local Government Finahce (Chicago:
Municipal Finance Officers Association 1975), pp. 391-396.
3^
scheduled in equal monthly installments with maturities
of 25-30 years. According to the Federal Housing Adminis¬
tration, mortgages originated during periods of relatively
high interest rates tend to be prepaid during subsequent
periods of lower interest rates. Prepayments are the
early repayment of mortgage loans. The significant
feature about prepa3nments is that they are determined by
the mortgagor and can take place at any point during the
27stated maturity schedule.
High interest rates is the primary reason prepay¬
ments occur. However, demographic and social factors
such as the rate of divorce, the age of the mortgagor,
population mobility, and rate of inflation play a role,
too. The precise relationships between any one or a com¬
bination of these factors and actual prepayments are not
known. The underlying concern here is that repa3mient of
loans must be timely and sufficient enough to meet bond
principal and interest requirements. In other words, the
proposed mortgage bond program must be structured so that
principal and interest obligations are met as stated in
the bond issues. If mortgagors prepay mortgages, a cash
flow results from the difference in planned repayments
27
Ronald W. Forbes and Peter J. Schmitt, "State
Housing Finance Agencies (A Special Report Analyzing Cash
Flow/Reinvestment Risk in Mortgage Purchase Programs,"
(New York: First Boston Corporation, 1978), pp. 6-9.
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and actual repayments . The difference in dollar amounts
between planned repayments and actual repayments has to be
reinvested into the market in such a way to meet later ma¬
turity dates and interest payments.
It will suffice to mention several dimensions of
the cash flow reinvestment problem. The problem involves
reinvestment of excess funds due to prepayments. The
dimensions fall into three categories: (1) actual pre¬
payments equal planned prepayments, (2) actual prepayments
are less than planned prepa3niients, and (3) actual prepay¬
ments exceed planned prepajmients. Dimensions two and
three create the more serious problem of cash flow re¬
investment risk. Dimension two means that actual prepay¬
ments begin at a markedly slower rate than planned pre¬
payments and cash inflows from the mortgage protfolio
will fail to cover debt service requriements. Dimension
three involves a greater rate in which actual prepajmients
exceed planned prepayments. The third dimension is gen¬
erally characterized with a larger cash inflow in early
years, a shorter duration of surplus years, a longer
duration of deficit years and a larger cumulative deficit.
Provisions in the proposed mortgage revenue bond program
must be flexible enough to allow for these problems.
VI. STRUCTURE OF CHICAGO’S RECENT TAX-
EXEMPT MORTGAGE REVENUE BOND
In July of 1978, the City of Chicago issued its
first tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds. The bonds sold
for $100 million. More than 2,100 borrowers were granted
mortgage loans aggregating approximately $83 million under
the first issue. The interest rate was nearly 2% below
the then-prevailing conventional mortgage loan interest
rate.
The purpose of the Chicago Mortgage Revenue Bond
Program is to assist creditworthy mortgage loan borrowers,
as measured by conventional lending standards, in obtain¬
ing financing for the purchase of single-family homes. The
program is not intended to benefit solely the poor, but a
combination of the lower and middle income levels. As a
result, the average household income level of the approved
applicants was $20,750.; twenty-eight percent of the ap¬
proved applicants had incomes of less than $15,000 and
eighty-nine percent of the approved applicants had incomes
of less than $30,000.
The broad objectives of the Chicago Mortgage Revenue
Bond Program are as follows:
(1) to assist persons whose income does not
exceed $40,000 in acquiring decent, safe
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and sanitary housing that residents can
afford. This allows more citizens to
purchase homes and to rehabilitate exist¬
ing housing in the City of Chicago
(2) to encourage construction of rental
housing in the City of Chicago
(3) to refocus attention on the advantages
of living in the City of Chicago with the
objective of generating a back-to-city
movement and thus, stem the outflow of
middle-class families from the city.
(4) to relieve conditions of unemplo3mient
and encourage economic development by the
infusion of new capital
(5) to preserve and increase the ad valorem tax
base and therefore strengthen the economic
base of the City of Chicago.
All mortgages were originated and serviced by First
Federal Savings and Loan of Chicago in accordance with their
normal underwriting practices subject to the following City
of Chicago's mandates:
(1) the maximum combined annual family income
for the borrower could not exceed $40,000
(2) the mortgaged property had to be located
within the corporate limits of the City
of Chicagoj and
(3) the property had to be the primary resi¬
dence of the borrower
Pa3niient of principal and interest is done solely
through monthly mortgage payments of the borrowers. The
program does not constitute a debt, liability, general or
moral obligation of the City to pay the principal and
28
Harvey Kapnick, "City of Chicago Mortgage Revenue
Bond Program" (Chicago: Advisory Committee's Report 1978),
pp. 1-12.
39
interest. Furthermore, the City does not pledge its full
faith and credit or any political subdivision of Illinois
to the payment of principal and interest to bondholders.
Loans were available at 7.99% interest for a
period of twenty-nine years. Two-to-six unit multifamily
housing is also eligible for financing under the program.
But, no more than 157o of the mortgage funds can be used
to finance multifamily housing.
The program also requires a capital reserve fund
from the bond proceeds. Principal and interests on the
bonds are paid from time to time with the capital reserve
fund. Bond proceeds are also used to establish a mort¬
gage reserve fund equal to 1507. of the total monthly pay¬
ment amount on all mortgages.
Generally, the actual mechanics involved in get¬
ting the funds from the bond buyer to home buyer is very
similar to any bond issue for a public purpose. First,
the City issues and sells the bond to any financial insti¬
tution through competitive bidding. Then, the bond pro¬
ceeds are turned over to a local trust company bank. The
mortgages are originated by a local Savings and Loan Associ¬
ation (the servicer) and are subsequently sold to the
company bank. The Savings and Loan Association collects
the monthly pajmients from the borrowers and remits the
money to the trust company bank. The trust company is re¬
sponsible for payments of principal and interest to bond¬
holders .
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The $100 million mortgage revenue bond issue in¬
volved two types of bonds: $41,49 million of serial bonds
with maturities from two to twenty-one years and $58.51
million in term bonds with thirty-one maturity years.
Serial bonds may be repaid at different time intervals
while term bonds are repaid in one lump sum on the matu¬
rity date, in this case, thirty-one years in the future.
However, the bonds are subject to early redemption
from early mortgage loan repa3mient and the capital reserve
funds. Usually, a substantial portion of the bonds are
redeemed prior to their maturity.
The important objective of the City of Chicago's
Mortgage Revenue Bond Program is that it is intended to
supplement the supply of private mortgage money for credit¬
worthy borrowers at low and moderate income levels. No
attempt was made to target available funds on the basis of
race, national origin, or geographic considerations. Loans
were granted to qualified, creditworthy borrowers on a
first-come, first-served basis. However, as the following
tables (Tables III and IV) indicate, beneficiaries o"£ the
program inherently are the middle income levels.
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The Mortgage Revenue Bond Program was designed
with the assumption that providing low-interest-rate loans to
qualified purchasers of homes in the City of Chicago would
refocus attention on the advantages of living in the City
Source: City of Chicago, Advisory Committee's Report on the
Chicago Mortgage Revenue Bond Program. (Tables III
and IV)
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As Tables III and IV reflect, the racial distri¬
bution of approved borrowers was generally consistent
with the distribution of the applications received. How¬
ever, the Chicago Mortgage Revenue Bond Program presents
several issues that need examination and analysis. Those
granted mortgage loans under the Chicago Plan could have
qualified for mortgage loans without the City attempting
to augment the mortgage money supply in the private sector.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issues raised by a proposed mortgage revenue
bond program for Atlanta have serious implications for low
income groups. These issues are prevalent in a period
called "New Federalism" or decentralization of decision¬
making. The City of Atlanta has designed housing pro¬
grams to alleviate its shortage of decent, safe, and sani¬
tary housing for the inner city poor. But these programs
have not served the needs of poor Atlantans. In part, the
inadequacy of the programs lies with the new federalism
approach of the federal government. The distribution of
Community Development Block Grants by the federal govern¬
ment without provisions for targeted poor areas contributes
largely to the inadequacy of Atlanta in serving the housing
needs of the poor. The federal government's policy on
inner city housing programs is seldom more than to require
that local housing programs be designed for the public
welfare.
The public policy questions relative to the pro¬
posed mortgage revenue bond program involve what neighbor¬
hoods will benefit from the program. How local officials
will select neighborhoods to benefit will prove difficult.
Developing criteria for selection of participants in a
4;3
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non-discriminatory way will also prove to be difficult.
The selection criteria under the proposed mortgage re¬
venue bond program will be the same criteria used by the
private sector in approving home loans. Very few poor
Atlantans will qualify for mortgage loans under conven¬
tional underwriting loan standards. Traditionally, this
has been the trend and as the aforementioned tables indi¬
cate, the proposed program will mainly serve the needs of
the upper middle and upper income groups.
Although Savings and Loan Associations in Atlanta
have sought more lucrative investments in suburbia, they
will be the primary originators of home loans under the
proposed mortgage revenue bond program. In my view, this
signifies a conflict of interest regarding the needs of
poor Atlantans and improving the housing stock of Atlanta.
According to the 1970 Census data, the median family
yearly income in Atlanta is $8,399; metropolitan Atlanta
had a median family income of $10,695. This means that
many poor Atlantans cannot possibly qualify for home loans
under the proposed mortgage revenue bond program. The
total estimated purchasing power of residents in an area
is also considered by Savings and Loan Associations in
mortgage investments. The 1970 Census data indicated
that, out of 120,000 families in Atlanta, the total income
was $1,272 billion; the 235,000 suburban families had a
total income of $3,935 billion. The suburbs, then, had
almost three times the purchasing power and only twice
the population. If these two disparities accurately
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describe Atlanta today, then Savings and Loan Associations
will continue to ignore their chartered obligations to
Atlantans in order to seek more lucrative investments in
the suburbs.
On the other hand, low mortgage investments by
Savings and Loan Associations are usually in neighborhoods
that are in racial transition or predominately black neigh¬
borhoods. One could interpret this lending pattern as
"redlining" or the refusal to make loans to certain neigh¬
borhoods irrespective of the creditworthiness of its in¬
habitants. Interviews with Research Atlanta indicated
that no conclusive evidence is available to document the
practice of "redlining." The question that remains is
what federal, state, or local strategies will be imple¬
mented to identify and prosecute financial institutions
that practice "redlining?" According to Robert Warwick,
the City of Atlanta has. been ineffective in monitoring the
two major current reinvestment housing programs of Atlanta,
the Atlanta Mortgage Consortitim and the Neighborhood
OQ
Housing Services.^ If this is the case, then, an addi¬
tional reinvestment housing program will only weaken what
little monitoring that presently exists. Therefore, the
proposed mortgage revenue bond program will only complicate
monitoring techniques and strategies employed by Atlanta.
^^Interview with Robert S. Warwick, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 1 February
1979.
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Market considerations, such as rating service re¬
quirements to sell bonds will also prove to be difficult
in Atlanta. Unlike the suburbs, Atlanta has a dispor-
tionate ntimber of lower income groups who live in substan¬
dard housing. As a result, a large share of the mortgage
money under the proposed mortgage program will have to be
channeled to these groups. However, rating companies con¬
sider the purchasing power of neighborhoods to which mort¬
gages are confined. In the final analysis, the City of
Atlanta could lose its credit rating and, therefore, bonds
would be difficult to sell. Furthermore, rating companies
require that geographical areas be diversified in terms of
race and income. Deteriorating black neighborhoods are
usually not diversified in race and income levels and
largely do not vary or meet private underwriting loan
standards.
On the other hand, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board of Atlanta has not publicly made known its position
on the proposed mortgage revenue bond program. Savings
and Loan Associations are regulated by the FHLBB and any
mortgage revenue bond program that could benefit the inner
city residents should be initiated after the position of
the FHLBB is made public and understood by elected offi¬
cials and community organizations of Atlanta.
The structure of a proposed mortgage revenue bond
program is also important. A first-come, first-served pro¬
vision would indicate that those Atlantans most informed
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about financial matters would be in a position to benefit
more to the detriment of those less informed. The elected
officials of Atlanta will also largely determine the
structure of a proposed mortgage program. Local policies
shift as administrations change.
In conclusion, the proposed mortgage revenue bond
program requires greater investigation and analysis by all
possible participants, community organizations, elected
officials, legal authorities, accountants, etc. Resolu¬
tion of the issue surrounding the proposed program would
probably suggest that alternatives to the proposed pro¬
gram could be more viable and effective in revitalizing
Atlanta's housing programs.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The City of Atlanta could implement a public
awareness program to inform Atlantans about conventional
lending patterns and the proposed mortgage revenue bond
program. Such an approach can be used to evaluate the
impact of various housing reinvestment programs on con¬
ventional lending levels throughout the City. Lending
institutions will inevitably be more sensitive to the
financing needs of the communities they were orignally
chartered to serve.
(2) Along with a public awareness program, the
City government could initiate a bank depositing program
in which a portion of city funds, interest free, would be
deposited in those lending institutions willing to make
home loans in certain neighborhoods at below market rates.
However, the City's water, sewer, and airport revenue
funds are required by state law to be invested in interest
earning accounts, as a result,only the General Euhd of the
City could be deposited in certain banks.
(3) A corollary to the aforementioned would be
strict enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, the 1968
Civil Rights Act and the Federal Home Loan Bank's antidis¬
crimination regulations. Enforcement of these laws would
lead to better lending patterns in Atlanta than present
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incentives, such as the Atlanta Mortgage Consortitrai. At
the same time, an effective monitoring system by the City
must be implemented.
(4) The City Government could also use some of
its monies to implement a mortgage insurance program.
The City could insure a portion of home mortgage loans
granted to Atlantans by lending institutions. The Com¬
munity Development Act of 1974 allows local housing au¬
thorities to use community development block grants for
30
mortgage insurance. Community development block grants
appear to be an ideal source of revenue for this purpose.
One must also realize that funds from any source are limi¬
ted and extensive investigation and financial analysis are
needed to venture into such a program.
30
U.S.. U.S. Code, 93rd Congress, 2nd session,
1974, III, 4093-6372.
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